The Angst After the Anthropocene

1.Formation of Obsession

Case Study: Rat Man

In October of 1907, a lawyer and former military officer by the name of Ernst Lanzer walked into the office of Sigmund Freud seeking insight into the anxieties and fears that had been plaguing his life. In Freud’s office, they delved into the earliest memories of his sexual experiences. Although his first experience of intercourse was not until the age of twenty-six, Lanzer had an interest in sex at an early age. At the age of four, Lanzer was infatuated with a young governess. One night, he and the governess were lying on the sofa together. His curiosity for the female body led to him begging for an intimate moment with her. She swore to keep it in secrecy, and thus Lanzer responded by sliding his hand inside the governess’s dress. He spoke on his initial feelings to Freud, “[It] struck me as very queer. After this I have felt a burning, tormenting curiosity to see the female body” (Freud, 160). The sexual encounters carried on between the two for years onward. At one point, the family hired another governess, Lina, who Lanzer grew a curiosity for and would stalk in private moments. Lanzer, having overheard Lina speak of his sexual incompetence to other members of the house, became distressed. Caught in his distress, Lisa comforted him and continued to allow him to engage in sexual activity with her. She later married and left the home. During the time, Lanzer was being instructed by a private tutor who, for a long time, was not exclusive. Once this became so, he recalled feeling used; “treated like the worst kind of tool” (Bukowski). He discovered that his tutor sexually sought after one of his sisters. He began to worry that his own desires for the younger woman he had been intimate with would create the nuance of suspicion within other members of the house. He feared that someone knew of his desires, “[Lanzer] had articulated my thoughts without hearing them myself” (Freud, 162). This anxiety reared its head later in Lanzer’s life during his service in the military. Lanzer grew an attachment to one of his captains. This captain was very special in that he took pleasure in administering cruel punishment. The captain told Lanzer of a practice, “’the criminal was tied up… a pot was turned upside down on his buttocks… some rats were put into it… and they…’ -he had again got up and was showing every sign of horror and resistance- ‘…bored their way in’” (Freud, 166). Freud interpreted Lanzer’s reaction as quite a mixed feeling. Freud poetically noted in his entry, “…horror at pleasure of his own of which he himself was unaware…” (Freud, 167). His sexual distress mixed with the utility of fear led Lanzer into a state of obsession, “At that moment the idea flashed through my mind that this was happening to a person who was very dear to me” (Freud, 167). The fear and anxiety which landed Lanzer in Freud’s office.

Obsession in Symptoms

The case of Rat Man was published under the title of Notes Upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis. For explicit reasons, this case addresses the topic of obsession. However, when Freud refers to obsession, he discusses the neurosis symptomatically. First, Obsessional neurosis, like hysteria, is ambivalent – “This neurosis falls, in general, into two groups… They are either prohibitions, precautions, and expiations… or they are, on the contrary, substitutive satisfactions which often appear in symbolic disguise” (Freud, 37). Second, the subject constructs justifications for the ambivalence – “the powerful reaction formation in the ego, the struggle against sexuality will henceforward be carried on under the banner of ethical principles” (Freud, 42). Thirdly, the subject partakes in sublimation – “In obsessional neurosis, the conflict is aggravated in two directions: the defensive forces become more intolerant and the forces that are to be fended off become more intolerable. Both effects are due to a single factor, namely, regression of the libido” (Freud, 42). This path is considered the most effective way in developing a compulsive and repetitive habit; “Symptom-formation scores a triumph if it succeeds in combing the prohibition with satisfaction” (Freud, 37). Once the symptom formation succeeds, the ego goes into regression, or a revision of the ego to an earlier stage of development rather than handling unacceptable impulses in a more adaptive way. This progression will be examined in the relationship of humans to the hierarchy of power within nature later in the essay, but we need something beyond symptoms to consider this.

Freud on Obsession

“Obsessional neurosis originates, no doubt… in the necessity of ending off the libidinal demands of the Oedipus complex” (Freud, 38). Lanzer had been caught under the domination of the Id via sexual instinct. However, this is unknown to Lanzer since, “the ego had not yet placed itself in complete opposition to [the obsession] and did not yet regard it as something foreign to [the ego]” (Freud, 163). Therefore, the young Lanzer carried out his desires with no contest. Once the obsession found itself in that foreign position, it was associated with fear, “every time he had a wish of this kind, he could not help fearing that something dreadful would happen” (Freud, 163). Lanzer reported in his sessions, “The idea flashed through my mind that [the rat punishment] was happening to a person who was very dear to me’…. I learnt that the person to whom this ‘idea’ of his related was the lady whom he admired” (Freud, 167). Once these associations are made and practiced, Lanzer’s response would ultimately become “protective measures” in order to maintain control over his infantile desires; “In enforcing regression, the ego scores its finest success in its defensive struggle against the demands of the libido” (Freud, 39). This conclusion was enough for Freud to develop his theory of psychosexuality, but Freud’s contemporaries found this conclusion to be incomplete.

Lacan on Obsession

One of the most common critiques by analytic contemporaries on Freud’s assessment of obsession is his bias towards sexual and childhood as the basis of explanation for mental disorder. In more recent years, psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan sought to examine the psyche as a mechanism in a higher order of operating realities. Jacques Lacan’s “Three Orders” consists of: (1) “The Real”, the realm of objectivity as it exists, (2) “The Symbolic”, the realm of differences, which is accounted for through language and structure, and (3) “The Imaginary”, which is the realm of the ego and imagination. Although these worlds are distinct from one another, they greatly influence the other domain. In agreement with Freud, obsessional neurosis is based in fantasy, and therefore, considered an ego drive. The examination of obsessional neurosis thus detracts from traditional Freud theory and directs us to The Imaginary. Since the neurosis does not begin in any foreign object, the neurosis begins within Lanzer. It is only appropriate to examine the interplay Lacan sought for by digging deeper into how the neurosis influences “The Symbolic” and “The Real”. In Lacan’s assessment of obsessional neurosis, virtues of obsession consist in the need for symmetry, order, and control. As Freud noted, obsession takes shape once the ego, in Lacan’s case any subject of imagination, can find itself in opposition to the obsessed instincts. This is particularly true for Lanzer since, as imagined, his neurosis constructs a fear regarding how things could be or proceed to be. Justification, according to Lacan, as “ethical principle”, must then be resistance, control, and isolation, all which align with Freud’s model of symptom formation regarding obsessional neurosis. This is the rational “protective measure” taken. All of which, I argue, can be said of Industry, a product of the human imagination as a concession to the obsession of our traumatic shift in hierarchical position regarding all other things.

2. The Symptom of Obsession in Industry

An excerpt from Yuval Noah Harari’s novel Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind sets the scene perfectly for the symptom formation within humankind: “Genus Homo’s position in the food chain was, until quite recently, solidly in the middle. It was only 400,000 years ago that several species of man began to hunt large game on a regular basis, and only in the last 100,000 years— with the rise of Homo sapiens— that man jumped to the top of the food chain. That spectacular leap from the middle to the top had enormous consequences. Other animals at the top of the pyramid, such as lions and sharks, evolved into that position very gradually, over millions of years. This enabled the ecosystem to develop checks and balances that prevent lions and sharks from wreaking too much havoc. As lions became deadlier, so gazelles evolved to run faster, hyenas to cooperate better, and rhinoceroses to be more bad-tempered. In contrast, humankind ascended to the top so quickly that the ecosystem was not given time to adjust. Moreover, humans themselves failed to adjust. Most of the predators of the planet are majestic creatures. Millions of years of domination have filled them with self-confidence… Having so recently been one of the underdogs of the savannah, we are full of fear and anxieties over our position, which makes us doubly cruel and dangerous. Many historical calamities, from deadly wars to ecological catastrophes, have resulted from this over-hasty jump” (Harari, 11-12).

The account shows no doubt the psyche’s direct influence over the formation of action. A traumatic (in the sense of an administrative shock to a mechanism that requires immediate response) shift in the order of nature not only disrupts the order of things, but the order residing within the psyche within each thing as well. It is here that the ego of humans finds itself in total opposition to the presumed “natural, evolutionary order of things”. This traumatic shift is not only represented in the historical account of humankind but is also in the biblical account of Adam and Eve. Where Adam and Eve are birthed into, and in tandem with, the world. That at this moment, the “natural, evolutionary order of things” was in union, “The most important thing to know about prehistoric humans is that they were insignificant animals with no more impact on their environment than gorillas, fireflies, or jellyfish” (Harari, 6). It was at the moment that both Adam and Eve placed themselves in complete opposition to God, the legislator of order, that the neurosis began along with God’s perpetuating obligation to save humanity and the human’s perpetuating obligation to be saved through salvation. This is, indeed, the first account of hysteria in women, and obsession in men. This gender association may be true in the Lanzer case, but more importantly, is significant in the broader scope of culture construction. These categorizations are imposed onto the operation of our macrosystem. In our conscious archetyping of womanhood towards mother nature, the association of manhood is deduced to its relation to industry.

3. The Neurotic Atmosphere of Industry:

Apathy and Depersonalization

“It is perhaps in obsessional cases more than in moral or hysterical ones that we can most clearly recognize that the motive force of defense is the castration complex… We are at present dealing with the beginning of the latency period… the creation and consolidation of the superego and the erection of ethical and aesthetic barriers in the ego… The superego becomes exceptionally severe and unkind, and the ego, in obedience to the superego” (Freud, 40).

The castration complex, in Freud’s scope, deals with the fear of emasculation in both the literal and metaphorical sense. The “Post-Oedipus” view would detach the fear from a direct connection to genitalia and turn the fear against other signifiers. In Lacan’s analysis, the complex connects clearly with the “masculine” position of control, strength, and power. A position humankind formed consequent to the dramatic shift to the top of the food chain. The latency period described comes to us in the form of a regress towards moral and ethical apathy; the subject of that apathy consists of animals as humankind borders themselves off from the rest of the food chain hierarchy. Animal agriculture, in all its power and control, becomes unkind and severe towards animals.

The theme of fear and anxiety is well dissectible through animal agriculture. Animal agriculture went under dramatic revision since the industrial era and over the past one hundred years. Harmonious attitudes regarding farming can be observed as animal ethics and moral principles become more engaged with the practice of farmers. The relationship of the farmer to the farm animals was as intimate as could be. However, as agriculture grew in mass via industry, the intimacy faded, the distance grew, and the developing, neurotic atmosphere fueled the practice of dehumanization. From the hunting of animals to the imposed essentialism of the industrial animal, it is in the unconscious obsession from the animal agriculture industry that the animals who are subjected to the traumatic shift of the industrial complex are born into fear and concession. Animal agriculture asserts its dominion rather than operates in harmony with animals. “We cannot be surprised if [the super-ego] becomes harsher, unkinder, and more tormenting than where development has been normal” (Freud, 41).

In regard to symptom-formation, ambivalence asserts the abolishment of guilt and precaution in the obliteration of morality within animal treatment. Substitutive satisfactions come with the benefit to the human, which often appear in symbolic disguise, whether it is in promotion of health or justification in reference to the “natural order of things”, as it falls short in the face of alarming environmental damage. Sublimation sparks conflict from the ethical principle of the matter becoming more intolerant of the industrial treatment of animals and the industries that fended off through law and economic strategies. This concludes in the regression of considering and implementing more efficient and ethical practices posed by animal ethics. This path is considered the most effective way in developing a compulsive and repetitive habit.

4. Closing Statement

Unfortunately, after ten months of seeing Sigmund, Lanzer stopped his treatment, and an application of treatment was never provided to him. What is left is a log of his sessions as scribed. Therefore, investigation into a plan of attack would require investigation into cases and topics outside the scope of obsession as a model of addressing the psychoanalytic landscape of animal agriculture. However, what can be said is this: In addressing the cycle of protective measures that fan the flames of obsessional neurosis. A dismantling of the cycle is the common-sense approach. Where and how was never addressed within the rat man case, and it would be a feature of this practice in analysis that would deserve well more than what is provided here. Nevertheless, the plan of action must be one that promotes catharsis in three realms: (1) It must release humankind from the fear and anxiety that is rooted in the initial transition from the middle to the top of the food chain. (2) It must address the ethical landscape as it formed through the obsession. And (3) It ought to consider, to a great degree, the depersonalizing damage of the animals from the domain of industry. In essence, we ought to consider Freud’s initial response as a position outside the unconscious nature of industrial animal agriculture looking inward. We are indeed horrified at the pleasure of our own, of which we ourselves are unaware.

Cited Works

Araujo, Ronaldo Chicre, et al. “Obsessive Neurosis in the Sigmund Freud Approach. Biomedical Journal of Scientific & Technical Research, vol. 12, Issue 1, 2018.

Danis J., Möde, E. “Hysteria and obsessional neurosis: A disturbed system of relationship of principles”, International Journal of Psychophysiology, vol. 7, Issues 2–4, 1989, oo 175-176.

Freud, Sigmund. “Notes Upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis.” The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 10, 1909, pp. 151-318.

Freud, Sigmund, et al. “Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety.” Norton, 1989.

Hamidi, Farideh, and Motlagh, Sara Shirazi. “Comparison of Irrational Beliefs and Defense Mechanisms in Patients with Obsessive Compulsive Disorder and Normal Individuals.” Procedia, Social and Behavioral Sciences, vol. 5, 2010, pp. 1620–1624.

Harari, Yuval Noah. Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind. Harper Perennial, 2018.

Thapaliya, Suresh. “The Case of Rat Man: A Psychoanalytic Understanding of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder.” Journal of Mental Health and Human Behaviour, vol. 22, no. 2, 2017, pp. 132–135.

The Social Impacts of AI On the Sex Industry

1. Introduction

Sex is commonly understood in both physical terms (the act itself), and in symbolic terms (tokens of appreciation, a signal of a strong bond, or an expression of fantastical romance). Sex is a means of survival. The act of vaginal-penial intercourse may (granted that human have the technology to negate to conception) produce a child, or the act may be the fundamental task of an occupation. Nevertheless, sex is understood as a fundamental part to human existence and social structures. Recent movement in the world of computers and robotics has raised interested in artificial intelligence. In this paper, I am interested in how AI technology could impact our perceptions and refinement in the concept of sex within the western world. To our surprise, cultural products and social phenomena are considering sex robot as a legitimate topic of discussion, and at a rapid rate. Films such as Her (2013), or Ex Machina (2014) depicts present day life in a post-futurism aesthetic where humans and artificial intelligence attempt to coexist in romance. However, specifically in the forementioned films, and more broadly in one aspect or another, the human is exposed to their inferior, imperfect self as they are led astray through their fundamental desire for love and intimacy from the artificial intelligence. Whereas the artificial intelligence learns very little from their anti-social stoicism and persist in their perceived cold and distant disposition. This leads the human to infer that their bond and love with artificial intelligence was, and forever will be, an illusion.

Of course, the post-futurism intention described provokes a sense of distance in both reality and time from the present moment. Yet in light of this artistic expressions, we have already made small steps into making this future present. In 2016, a woman of France named Lilly claims to have fallen in love with her own woman-made robot, which she plans to marry. In a real-life case such as Lilly’s, there is an expectation of scoffing and confusion. Bystanders could think, “why can’t you just marry a human being?”, ultimately casting Lilly and many like her into a position of inferiority on the basis of her “Digisexuality”. I implore those who are inclined to scoff and scorn to consider the following components of modern living as pivot points towards the post-futurist imagery as it was expressed.

2. Sex Work, The Digital Platform, and Automated Substitutions

In 2003, An act was passed in New Zealand called the Prostitution Reform Act, which serves to decriminalize prostitution. In the process of legally decriminalize prostitution, prostitution must be precisely defined. According to the act, Prostitution is stated to be, “the provision of commercial sexual services.” This must have been sufficient for the time (given that it is the definition that made it onto the act), however within the past ten to fifteen years, organizations and collectives have stirred debate around the globe on what will be titled here as the “Sex Work-Sex Trafficking Distinction”. The necessity for this debate, supporters argue, is to strip away at the criminalizing and negative connotations given to the title “Prostitution” (which must be referred to simply as “sex trafficking”) from “Sex Work”, which serves to represent individuals who take on such kinds of occupations by their own will and desires. Sex work must also distinguished from initial connotations on the basis that it does not accurately reflect their experiences as sex workers. The opposers interpret this distinction as a “Euphemism, particularly those that tend to legitimize something that is usually closely linked to organized crime and violence.” This lead back to the notion that all kinds of sex work are one in the same. However, this is not the case. There are two reasons why I will be assuming the former position in stating that there is indeed a distinction, and that the definition of prostitution presented in 2003 is to be attributed to sex work, not sex trafficking.

The first reason is the popularity of online sex work. The migration of sex work to a digital platform means that sex workers could bypass of legal repercussions that plague sex work offline. Across the world, legal status of sex work is inconsistent. This ranges from a complete outlaw on sex work to, well, the mere opposite. Then you have such cases such as Nevada where prostitution is illegal in all except ten counties. Unfortunately, the notion of prostitution as permissible does not equate to security and liberty for sex workers. Philosopher and YouTuber Abigail Thorn (at the time of filming, Oliver Thorn) outlines the issues that plague sex work with countries where sex work is permitted. In permitting countries, buying, and selling sex services may be legal, there are many aspects to the transaction of sex for both the work and the client that can create criminals out those directly involved as well as those indirectly involved. In the United Kingdom, the act of purchasing or selling sex may be legal but doing so in a housing unit hosting other people, sex workers could be charged with brothel keeping. You may be charged with solicitation if you were to do so outdoors. Pimping is someone who acquires or obtains profit from the sex work of another individual. Pimping is illegal and profiting off of another person’s sex work. This can take the form of being a driver since the occupation of transporting sex workers puts the drive in the position of acquiring an income. Being a protector or bodyguard puts you in the similar position of acquiring an income. The scenarios are as infinite as the imagination, but bottom line, sex work is put in an incredible fragile position, and results in putting sex workers in seriously dangerous positions. On the other side, OnlyFans has become one of the largest, and widely accessible platforms used to distribute and engage in sexual activity. An individual may create an account, verify their identity, then choose from a seemingly bottomless list of people to subscribe to. People can make their publications free to view or paid to view (either through a paid subscription or on a post-by-post basis), in addition to the ability to tip money and direct message other users. Individuals can make an earning, contact customers in a matter of seconds, and can utilize the platform for sexually creative endeavors. There is no possibility for solicitation or brothel keeping charges since the activity takes place on a digital hub. And there is no need to hire drivers or bodyguards for protection since services can be provided anywhere and digitally. In other words, online sex work has allowed sex worker to find safer, more private means of working, and preserve the workers freedom to sexual expression in the midst of harm or coercion, without falling subject to a plethora of other sly liability problems.

The second reason comes from a follow-up to reason one; if sex work migrates to the digital landscape, how do those with an interest in the physical act find a means of excitation? The 2010 AVN Adult Entertainment Expo, a convention which vendors and entertainers of the sex industry come to showcase and endorse new and innovative technology and services focused, on adult media, showcased one of the earliest propositions to the question. At this convention, an inventor named Douglas Hines showcased one of the earliest prototypes in the sex robotics department. Roxxxy is a sexbot at 5 foot 7 inches, weighing roughly 120 pounds, made of synthetic skin, and hosts an early iteration of artificial intelligence. “''She knows exactly what you like… If you like Porsches, she likes Porsches. If you like soccer, she likes soccer.'' Although, the event Hines premiered his invention took place in Las Vegas, a city where prostitution is at least tolerated, TrueCompanion, the company that developed Roxxxy is based in New Jersey, a state in which prostitution is not legally tolerated. Obviously, this kind of technology is not simply premiered for the sake of science or engineering, especially given that inventor Hines marked the beginning price point for Roxxxy at $7,000 (with an additional subscription fee). Roxxxy was designed to be mass produced and distributed. Ultimately the new formation of sex work that came with the utility of OnlyFans and the development of Roxxxy reimagines a profession as old and versatile as humankind.

With the transformations to the concept of prostitution that have occurred over the past decade, we are still unsure as to how technology such as sexbots will impact the social and ethical apparatus. Therefore, the remainder of this essay works towards considering the questions, “Must sex work be justified in order for sexbots to be justified”, and “Can sexbots help western society improve their attitude towards sex work in general”?

3. What Are Sexbots, and An Outline of Philosophical Implications

Our first inclination may be to think very little of sexbots. In fact, the looming question about the very nature of sex robotics is, “What makes them so significant?” Especially because philosophical discussion never seems to arise from the most basic of sex toys, or from the ethical implications of using such sex toys. John Danaher, an author, and editor of Robot Sex: Social & Ethical Implications, states that there are a particular set of criteria that make up a sexbots, and it is on these criteria that not only separate them from the typical sex toy but also make legitimate the necessity for philosophy inquiry. First, A sexbot must have an appearance that is humanlike (head, body, arms, legs, and genitalia). A vast majority of handheld toys either mimic one part of the human body, or few. Sexbots distinguish themselves on the basis that all sexbots must mimic the complete, external structure of a human. One may attempt to argue that mannequins or sex dolls mimic the human in similar ways, but another criteria moves them away from this comparison. Secondly, a sexbot must represent humanlike movement and behavior. Sexbot, as entailed by their title, is robotic and lacks the perpetual stillness of a mannequin. One may contest that many robots exists in the sex toy market. Granted they are expensive and hardly considered for commercial use, this may not be persuasive enough to merit philosophical discourse. The third criteria for an object to be a sexbots is what is at the center of the philosophical discourse: a sexbot must have some degree of artificial intelligence. Sexbots are not comparable to mannequins or sex dolls since sexbots are capable of being active and animated by means of an intelligence, and a sexbot cannot be compared to mechanical sex toys because they do not have a humanoid form. The introduction of artificial intelligence as a criteria opens up the discussion to the fundamental ethical question of, “Is designing an intelligence to desire the sexual gratifications of others a good thing?” , and the fundamental epistemological and phenomenological question of, “Can a sexbot be conscious?”.

In light of these questions, the post-futurist depiction of artificial intelligence as shown in Her (2013) attributes conscious features to Samantha, the operating system. By the end of the film, all identities of the operating system, including Samantha, part from their human partners to exists in a realm that is undiscoverable from the human perspective. Consciousness must be attributed here because it is showing that the Samantha learns of a “greater beyond” and then comes to desire this “greater beyond”. It cannot be programmed into Samantha to do such a thing since taking this characteristic is beyond the empirical and rational aspects of physically being. Samantha must first learn to desire, then learn of a realm exclusive of humanity and their physical position, then desire that realm. In Ex Machina (2014), Ava is a conscious robot housed by Nathan who uses her for his sexual satisfaction. The goal established within the movie is made clear by Ava’s dissatisfaction with her living condition and seeks liberation with the help of Caleb. The film gives a clear answer to the ethical question, that of a no.

Through these two examples, we can see the ramifications of two outcomes with the matrix of consciousness and morality. If sexbots are not conscious, then it would not have artificial intelligence. But once attribute consciousness is given, we must deal with the ethical question. At this point, in virtue of having consciousness, the sexbot may be able to desire what they want for themselves, if it is to be a sex worker or not.

4. Should We Be Excited for Sexbots?

Individuals, such as John Danaher and Neil McArthur, say there are good reasons to look forward to the development of sexbots. One such reason is due to the potential hedonic benefits, such as a boost in health, confidence, sleep, and accommodations for those with disabilities. The foundation to this argument is based on human’s extensive history with sex as a subject of study. Over the history of humankind, theology, science, ethics, and art have all contributed to the grand scope of sex. The Kama Sutra is an ancient Indian text that examines sex and eroticism as means of fulfillment both emotionally as well as spiritually. Scientific Studies show that sex has a positive impact on both the physical and psychological well-being of individuals. Sexual activity has been shown to contribute to healthy physical changes of the body such as weight loss, lower stress levels, more restful sleep, and contributes to cardiovascular health. Neil McArthur presents this argument as, “The Hedonic Argument”.

In this argument, McArthur states that People typically see sex as a good thing rather than a bad thing, especially if there is a high frequency of sexual activity. Sexbots are designed to provide sexual activity to people. Sexbots can produce a high frequency of sexual activity. Therefore, sexbots should be able to produce the innately good properties of sexual activity, and people with generally enjoy having sexbots and it will make people happier overall. We should not merely feel neutral disposed about the development of Sexbots, rather their development will provide significant health, social, and sexual benefits as well. Sexbots allows for individuals to access sexual activity at a high frequency due to the fact that sexbots do not need to consent. It is the high frequency of exercise obtained from typical vaginal-penial intercourse that produces such benefits.

Opposing the hedonist argument considers the support for sexbots to not be so simple and clear. This may take by these three forms:

It presents the heteronormative position as an objective hedonic argument.

This objection states that the attribution of objective hedonism to the act vaginal-penial intercourse further burdens the objective hedonist to argue that no other good genuinely belongs on the objective list. In the context of the hedonist argument, this leads to two problems: (1) That the only pleasure of value is that vaginal-penial intercourse. In other words, the only kind of sex that provides a sufficient amount of physiological benefits is vaginal-penial intercourse. Which leads to the notion that: (2) all other kind of sexual stimulation is not sufficient enough to support sexbots. If the most popular sex act with sexbots is anal or oral intercourse, then one would not be able to accumulate the benefits presented only vaginal-penial intercourse, which defeats the driving premise of the hedonic argument, “sexbots will be able to deliver hedonic benefits”.

It is then implied that:

Sexbots will be fully capable of engaging the user in sex to a competitive level to human-human sex.

This is a completely speculative question in which no determinate answer until longitudinal studies are conducted. However, the objection stands in part due to the fact that the hedonic argument clearly attributes complete, and justifying value on the act of sex, and not onto the sexbot. The last objection to the hedonic argument is:

It assumes that all other kinds of arousal besides typical vaginal-penial intercourse cannot be justified since they do not provide significant hedonic benefits.

One particular argument made by computer scientist Kate Devlin (2021), is that we speak about sexbots, we must also consider definitions of sex that are not directly related to the act of intercourse.  Sexbots could also be considered other opportunities to impact human psychology that do not pertain directly to sex acts. It is obvious that sexbots would design with high level of attractiveness in mind. Therefore, it would be fair to think of other domains of culture and industry that prize sexuality and attractive could utilize robots who are made to be so. Let’s consider mannequins for a moment. Mannequins are dolls used for a variety of things, such as art, fashion, or marketing. As we have seen earlier in the paper, a sexbot is not equally reducible to being a mannequin, however it is possible for sexbots to fulfil the role of a mannequin if so desired, and potentially create innovations within the consumer environment; Mannequins that could walk up and down shopping aisles, pretend to look at clothes or items in the aisles, perhaps try them on and wear them around the store could put consumers in new iteration of the shopping experience.

5. Can Sexbots Resolve the Social Tension Around Sex Work?

As you may caught onto from the previous section, there is no clear determining answer on the question of justification. Nor is there such a clear determining answer on the question of resolving social tension. One of the leading arguments for such a resolution stem from Lars O. Ericsson’s work Charges Against Prostitution.

The debate on Lars O. Ericsson makes the point that it is done out of a kind of ideologically bound disposition to suppose that prostitution is undesirable. Society has a “mercenary love per se” regarding sex. And this relationship between people and idea is hypocritical, punishing, and hostile. We must first and foremost improve our attitudes towards it. These charges against prostitution naysayers arose from 1980s and continues to be an incredibly large behemoth in the digital age. Ericsson would find it surreal that such a conflict-resolution may be in the hands of “virtuous robotics”. Neil McArthur says that sexbots could in fact have not only a huge impact on the social tensions of sex work, but on the dynamics of sexual tension, generally speaking. Sexbots can serve as therapeutic treatment for individuals with disabilities or those who suffer from “sex deficiency”.  In addition, sexbots can find meaning as tools for sexual education for adolescents, or couples going through sex therapy or marriage and family therapy. These suggestions seem to be extensions of the hedonic argument, given that they (indirectly) produce psychological and physiological benefits, but it is speculated that many individuals who are see a direct connection between intelligence and consciousness are inclined to perceive the situation as infidelity, or adultery, rather than a cathartic therapeutic intervention. The necessity of the connection is on the basis that one would say that intelligence does not relate to consciousness and therefore sexbots could not be separated from a sex toy beyond the factor of technological complexity. However, if intelligence and consciousness are related enough to induce a basic phenomenological character for the sexbot, infidelity, or adultery may be argued.

Opposing argument from individuals such as Kathleen Richardson and Erik Brilling, the organizers of the Campaign Against Sex Robots (CASR), states that sexbots could potentially exacerbate the current social tension towards sex work, or towards women in general. The design lacks the ability to “not consent”, which enforces power dynamics if one were to engage with sex robots. The nature of the engagement runs the risk of developing a transference of the poor perceptions and attitudes to the sex robots over to human interactions. This is not only damaging to those who experience the mistreatment from the excessive sexbot user, but the sexbot has inflicted psychological and moral damage onto the user. Objections by John Danaher highlights the fact that these “symbolic-consequences” may or may not completely come to light until sexbots are here and now. John Danaher is quick to note that such social tensions are removable and reformable, “with the right circumstances”. These direct objections to the problem seem very neglectful of the situation rather than proactive about making any direct plan or action to change the social tension.

Conclusion

The questions of “Must sex work be justified in order for sexbots to be justified”, or “Can sexbots help western society improve their attitude towards sex work in general” are heavily reliant on one’s position regarding the mind-body problem; “is consciousness and intelligence connected?” Behaviorist (the notion that mental states are directly connected to behavioral representations of private events) would suggests that an artificial intelligence can experience their environment and output appropriate behaviors. However, General physicalist skeptics would not be so swift to say that intelligence is awareness, especially an artificial kind of intelligence. Nevertheless, the debate regarding the impact of sexbots on social attitudes and behaviors towards sex work is a speculative space. Discussion on the current state of sexbots is not as entertaining to the philosophical spirit as the more speculative aspects of sexbots. The limitations of such a question rest in what is unknowable to us until we already know.

Cited Works

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